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1 Introduction
More than one billion people worldwide are estimated to be living and working outside
of their origin communities, be they international or internal migrants. In the developing
world, remittances sent by migrants make a direct contribution to increasing income of
the families left behind, and as such they contribute to easing budget constraints of the
poorest, reducing poverty and improving average living conditions (Acosta et al., 2008).
How these private transfers are spent or used by the families left behind is yet another
issue, with potentially important consequences for the economic development in migrant-
sending communities. In theory, remittances may alter household expenditure patterns
in various ways, depending on how these financial flows are considered by the left behinds
(Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010, 2013). If migrants are treated as full family members and
their income as part of the pooled household income, then remittances are expected to be
used as any other source of income and one should not observe any behavioural change
in expenditure (Castaldo and Reilly, 2007; Adams et al., 2008). Another strand of the
literature focuses on the role that remittances play on relaxing the budget constraint of
the family left behind. A pessimistic view argues that remittances may leave investment
decisions unchanged if they are spent on status-oriented, conspicuous consumption, and as
such they may have little impact on local economies. A more optimistic view argues that
remittances are a transitory source of income for families left behind, and are therefore
invested, at the margin, rather than consumed. In that case, remittances may foster
investment in human and physical capital at home (Adams, 1998).
The purpose of this paper is to examine how remittances sent by rural-to-urban mi-
grants are spent by families left behind in rural China, by using a large cross-sectional
dataset, the Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) database for the year 2007. China
provides an interesting ground to explore the impact of remittances on sending communi-
ties because the country is currently experiencing the greatest internal labour migration
in history. On April 29, 2015, the National Bureau of Statistics of China released the
2014 Rural-urban Migration Monitoring Survey showing that the total number of internal
migrant workers amount to 274 million, which is more than the total stock of interna-
tional migrants worldwide. Although there is no official survey on total remittances sent
by internal migrants in China, Cheng and Xu (2005) estimated that in 2005 the total
remittances sent by rural migrants to their family left behind was ranging between 191
and 330 billion yuan. Hu and Shi (2013) corroborate these findings and estimate that
China’s annual remittances from rural migrants amount to more than 300 billion yuan.
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Empirical studies on remittances and household expenditure behaviour in migrant-
sending regions provide mixed evidence. A broad literature has highlighted the positive
effect of remittances on the investment activities of the left behinds. For example, using
the 2005-06 Ghana Living Standards Survey, Adams and Cuecuecha (2013) find that re-
mittances are spent more at the margin on investment goods including education, housing,
and health than on food. Similar conclusions have been reached on Guatemala (Adams
and Cuecuecha, 2010), Ecuador (Göbel, 2013), Colombia (Cardona-Sosa and Medina,
2006), Mexico (Taylor and Mora, 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2011), the Philip-
pines (Yang, 2008), Nigeria (Osili, 2004) or Eritrea (Kifle, 2007). Yet, a few recent studies
show that in some countries, remittances are not put to productive uses and tend to leave
investment expenditure behaviour unchanged. Using the 2003 Tajikistan Living Stan-
dards Measurement Survey, Clément (2011) finds no evidence of any positive impact of
remittances on investment expenditures. Instead, remittances are regarded as short-term
coping strategies helping left behind households achieving a basic level of consumption.
Cattaneo (2012) finds no education enhancing effect of remittances sent to Albania by
international migrants and ascribes the low share of investment expenditures to the weak-
ness of local education systems.
As far as China is concerned, empirical findings from the still scarce literature on re-
mittances and expenditure patterns of the left behinds also contrast with the optimistic
view of remittances as a mean to increased investment in sending communities. Using
data collected from 60 randomly selected villages of 6 provinces in rural China, de Brauw
and Rozelle (2008) find a significant relationship between migration and consumptive
investment (measured by investment in housing and durable goods) between 1995 and
2000, but no significant relationship between migration and productive investment. The
relationship between migration and consumptive investment is shown to be particularly
strong in non-poor areas, whereas it is not significant in poor areas. Exploiting data col-
lected in 2006 on 1,498 households in Anhui and Jiangsu, Zhu et al. (2012) obtain similar
findings, with remittances being mainly used for consumption and not for investment pur-
poses. Zhu et al. (2014) confirm that remittances are considered as a permanent source of
income by households left behind using data from the Rural Household Survey undertaken
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China in the provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui
and Sichuan in 2001 and 2004.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we investigate how remittances
affect the expenditure patterns of receiving households in rural China by using recent
data specifically collected to study rural-to-urban migration in China. Unlike small-
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scale databases used in previous studies, the Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC)
database is unique by its spatial coverage and its large scale (Akgüc et al., 2014). The
rural household survey comprises 8,000 households in 9 provinces and gathers detailed
information on household expenditure and its composition. We focus on the differentiated
impact of remittances on various expenditure components, which allows us to refine and
extend the debate concerning whether remittances do serve any investment purpose in
rural China. This is important from a policy point of view because a non-investment use
of remittances flowing from the massive labor movement out of rural areas could impede
rather than help rural development in the long run.
Second, identifying whether or not remittances influence budget allocation of families
receiving these income transfers raises an endogeneity issue: there might be confounding
factors that influence both the likelihood of receiving remittances and the household’s ex-
penditure behaviour. The existing literature typically uses two main approaches to solve
this methodological issue: an instrumental variable (IV) strategy or a propensity score
matching (PSM) approach. Unlike previous studies on China that identify the effect of
remittances using an IV strategy (de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Zhu et al., 2012, 2014),
we apply propensity score matching to identify the impact of remittances on the expendi-
ture patterns of the families left behind. In the absence of reliable instruments, the PSM
method offers the advantage of controlling for self-selection based on observable character-
istics without imposing too strong distributional assumptions (Jimenez-Soto and Brown,
2012), although it relies on a strong identifying assumption of selection on observables.
Third, our findings add to the empirical literature on the impact of migration and
remittances on families left behind (Antman, 2013). We find evidence of remittances
supplementing income and increasing per capita consumption of rural households, with
the effect being stronger for non-poor households. This results are consistent with earlier
findings on China on the non-investment use of remittances (de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008).
When it comes to budget components, we find that remittance-recipient households allo-
cate a smaller share of their budget to education than non-recipients do, and we thus add
evidence to the possible negative effect of migration on education outcomes of children
who stay behind. There is a growing strand of the literature on migration and the left be-
hinds that focuses on this specific link and that reaches contrasted conclusions depending
on the country studied, the type of migration and the characteristics of those left behind.
On the one hand, evidence of a positive effect of remittances on the school attendance
of children left behind has been provided in the Philippines (Yang, 2008) and in Mexico
(Alcaraz et al., 2012), notably for girls (Antman, 2012). Recently, Böhme (2015) has
4
shown that international Moldovan migrants increase education aspirations at home, and
Démurger and Xu (2015) have stressed the importance of education for migrant parents in
China. On the other hand, the absence of parents in the household due to migration has
been found to lead to reduced investment in children’s education in a number of studies.
McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) provide evidence that living in a migrant household lowers
the probability for boys completing junior high school and for boys and girls completing
high school in rural Mexico. Similar findings are highlighted on Albania by Giannelli and
Mangiavacchi (2010). In rural China, de Brauw and Giles (2008) show that rural-urban
migration opportunities reduce the probability of high school enrolment, and Zhang et al.
(2014) find significant negative impacts of being left-behind by both parents on children’s
cognitive development. The strong evidence of a negative impact of remittances on the
education budget share we find in this paper resonates with this literature and points to
the ambiguous perception of skill premium in China, notably in the migrant labor market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data from rural China and pro-
vides descriptive statistics. The empirical strategy is presented in Section 3. Estimation
results follow in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The data used in this paper come from the Rural Household Survey administered by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) under the Rural-Urban Migration in China
(RUMiC) project carried out in 20081. The survey design and implementation are detailed
in Meng et al. (2010) and in Akgüc et al. (2014). The survey covers 8,000 rural households
from 800 villages, in 82 counties and nine provinces (Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui,
Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Chongqing and Sichuan). It includes detailed information on
a wide range of household and individual socio-economic characteristics. At the household
level, it provides information on expenditures, assets and remittance income received
for the year 2007. A village survey is also attached to the household survey. Missing
observations for a few variables, either at the individual or the village level, and outlying
data on expenditure reduce our final sample size to 7,682 households.
1The RUMiC survey consists of three parts: the Urban Household Survey, the Rural Household
Survey and the Migrant Household Survey. It was initiated by a group of researchers at the Australian
National University, the University of Queensland and Beijing Normal University and was supported by
the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), which provides the Scientific Use Files. The financial support
for RUMiC was obtained from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Agency for International
Development (AusAID), the Ford Foundation, IZA and the Chinese Foundation of Social Sciences.
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The definition of rural households in the context of migration is worth explaining. Ru-
ral households are composed of all members declared during the survey, be they currently
living in the village or in another place. Following the NBS definition, migrant-sending
households are households with members working outside their home county and having
been living away for at least 6 months over the preceding year. Remittance-receiving
households consist of all the households who report migration income. They may or may
not be migrant-sending households, and this will depend on whether the migrant sends
back remittances and on whether the family receives remittances from migrants who are
not direct family members (e.g. relatives or friends). As we are interested in the ex-
penditure and the consumption patterns of the left behinds, we impose that per capita
variables (income, expenditure and consumption) are defined on household members cur-
rently living in the village2. The household size is thus calculated excluding household
members who were declared as migrants in 2007.
In order to explore the budget allocation patterns of rural households, we consider
different types of expenditure that follow the definition provided by the NBS. Total
household expenditures are classified in 3 categories: expenditures for household busi-
ness, consumption expenditures, and other expenditures (including taxes and fees, ex-
penses on properties and on transfers). Expenditures for household business include all
expenses related to family agricultural and non-agricultural activities, such as investment
in productive fixed assets, employment for the construction of productive fixed assets, etc.
Consumption expenditures are further categorized into 5 components: 1) food, clothing
and other goods and services; 2) durables goods (including home appliances, furniture,
transportation equipment); 3) housing; 4) education, culture and recreational services; 5)
health care and medical services3. The first category covers pure consumption spending
on non-durable goods. Expenditures on durable goods and on housing fall into “consump-
tive investment” as defined by de Brauw and Rozelle (2008): “consumptive investments
directly improve the quality of life for members of the household, by increasing the flow
of services from their durable asset stock, rather than helping them raise their income
through increased production” (page 323). The last 2 categories correspond to spending
on human capital.
2Excluding current migrants in the calculation of per capita variables implicitly assumes that migrants
do not draw anything from the household budget. We cannot rule out the possibility that part of the
households’ spending may be done by migrants, either at destination if the household is contributing to
the living expenses of the migrant, or at home in case of return. By imposing that migrants have been
living away for at least 6 months, we limit the importance of very short migration episodes. Yet, we may
still over-estimate per capita expenditures of the left behinds.
3See Mao and Xu (2014) for a description of the content of each category.
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Unsurprisingly, migrant-sending households and remittance-receiving households do
not perfectly match: 3,724 households (48.5% of the sampled households) receive re-
mittances; 3,346 households (43.6%) are migrant-sending; 19.5% of the migrant-sending
households do not receive remittances, and 23.7% of the remittance-receiving house-
holds are not migrant-sending4. Table 1 shows that remittance-receiving households and
non remittance-receiving households strongly differ in terms of household characteristics.
Households that receive remittances tend to be larger (before migration), they have more
adult members but fewer old dependent people, and they are more likely to have children
(both pre-school and of school age). Unsurprisingly, remittance-receiving households are
disproportionately found in central and western provinces, which are the main rural mi-
grants sending areas in China. In contrast, more than half of non-receiving households
live in coastal (migration destination) areas.
Table 2 provides a comparison of the two groups in terms of income and expenditure.
Whereas there is no significant difference in total income between non remittance-receiving
and remittance-receiving households, there are significant differences in per capita terms.
The computation of per capita income either including or excluding migrants reveals in-
teresting features. The migrant-included calculation, which broadly reflects the per capita
earnings capacity of the household, shows that non-receiving households are able to earn
a significantly higher per capita income than receiving households. The migrant-excluded
calculation, which rather reflects the per capita spending capacity of the rural house-
hold, shows the exact opposite, with a significantly higher spending capacity of receiving
households. This feature is corroborated by the significant gap in per capita consumption
level, with remittances-receiving households spending on average 14% more per capita
than non-receiving households. The composition of household income further shows that
remittances are a major component of income for receiving households (44% of their total
net income on average) whereas local non-farm sources of income are disproportionally
low compared to non-receiving households: the net wage income from local off-farm ac-
tivities is 3.4 times larger on average for non-receiving households, and the net income
from family off-farm operation is 4.1 times larger. These figures all point to the possible
strong dependence of receiving families upon the particular source of income made by re-
mittances: they have a lower per capita earnings capacity and are less likely to get income
from local off-farm activities, either through wage work or through individual business.
To further document the relation between income and remittances, Table 3 displays
4This does not necessarily imply that 24% of the remittance-receiving households have never sent any
migrant to cities, but rather that in the year 2007, they had no migrant members (although they received
transfers counted as remittances that year).
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the distribution of households and the average amount of remittances across pre-migration
transfer (i.e. excluding remittances) income quartiles. It shows that households in the first
and the second quartile are the most likely to receive remittances: 36.31 percent (resp.
29.40 percent) of households in the bottom (resp. second) quartile of the pre-transfer
income distribution receive remittances in 2007. By contrast, the proportion of households
receiving remittances in the third and the top quartile is much smaller, at respectively
23.07 percent and 11.22 percent. Interestingly, not only the poorest households are the
most likely to receive remittances, but the average amount of remittances they receive is
also much larger than that of the other quartiles and it represents a much larger share
of their average total income (almost 60 percent as opposed to less than 6 percent for
the top quartile). These figures suggest that families that have access to local higher-
returns economic activities have less incentive to send migrants (Démurger and Li, 2013),
a conjecture also supported by the larger amount of local off-farm income and property
income of non remittance-receiving households (Table 2).
Finally, Table 4 documents the relationship between remittances and the expendi-
ture and consumption profile of rural households. Rural households in China allocate
almost three quarters of their total spending for consumption, and one-fifth for family
business. Remittance-receiving households are found to spend a significantly higher share
on both consumption and family business than non-receiving households. The decompo-
sition of consumption expenses into 5 components highlights further differences between
households. Unsurprisingly, the main component of households’ budget is non-durable
goods (mostly food and clothing), which accounts for more than 61% of the total bud-
get. Cross-tabulations with remittance-receiving status show that the rate is slightly
higher for remittance-receiving households, and the difference is statistically significant
at 1 percent. Yet, the most obvious difference between remittance-receiving and non-
receiving households appears in the budget share for education, with a gap of more than
20% in favour of non-receiving households. Whereas non-receiving households spend on
average 8.12 percent of their consumption expenses on education, households that re-
ceive remittances spend 6.68 percent, and the gap is significant at 1 percent. Given that
remittance-receiving households are more likely to have school-aged children (see Table 1),
this finding is unexpected and questions expenditure choices made by rural households.
The situation is similar for health expenditures although the gap is smaller (6.02 percent
against 5.83 percent) and non-significant. In contrast, remittance-receiving households
spend relatively more on durable goods than non-receiving households, but not differ-
ently on housing. These raw statistics offer first evidence on the use of remittances by
the families left behind: remittances represent a large share of income for the poorest
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households and they seem to be spent on consumption more than on investment (notably
in human capital).
3 Methodology
As in all migration-related studies, exploring the impact of remittances on expenditure
patterns of the families left behind requires to address the potential endogeneity of the
remittances variable: there may be characteristics that make receiving households system-
atically different from non-receiving households, and this could lead to biased estimates
of the impact of remittances on the outcome of interest. In particular, the likelihood to
receive remittances may be affected by the same factors that could also explain household
expenditure behaviour. The empirical literature that estimates the impact of remittances
on receiving households using cross-sectional data typically resorts to two main techniques
to handle this selection issue: an instrumental variable (IV) approach (e.g. Adams and
Cuecuecha, 2010, 2013; Göbel, 2013) or a propensity score matching (PSM) approach (e.g.
Clément, 2011; Jimenez-Soto and Brown, 2012; Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014). Whereas
IV has been shown to work well as an identification strategy, finding a suitable instrument
remains a challenge (McKenzie et al., 2010). In the absence of a good candidate for a
reliable instrument, we rely on the second approach and apply propensity score matching
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). As discussed below, this method is not without its own
faults as it relies on a strong identifying assumption, and various sensitivity tests are
needed to assess the quality of the estimates (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
3.1 The Propensity Score Matching framework
Building upon the evaluation literature, the objective of matching methods is to provide
a comparison group to a “treated” group in the case of observational studies. In our
case, we compare households that receive remittances (the treated group) with otherwise
similar households that do not receive remittances (the control group). After correcting
for the non-random selection of the treatment participants through matching, we can then
estimate average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) that is, the impact that receiving
remittances has on a range of expenditures for recipient households, using non-recipient
households as a counterfactual for what recipient households’ outcomes would have been
in the absence of remittances.
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Formally, the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can be derived
as follows. Denote Ti the treatment that equals 1 if the household i receives remittances
and 0 otherwise. The potential outcome of interest for household i is Yi1 if household i re-
ceives remittances and Yi0 otherwise. Given these definitions, the impact of the treatment
Ti on household i is given by:
δi = Yi1 − Yi0 (1)
From this definition, the average treatment effect on the treated is defined as:
ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|T = 1) (2)
Estimating this ATT poses an identification problem because Yi0, the non-treatment
outcome of the treated group, cannot be observed directly for treated households and
must be estimated. Matching methods offer a solution to estimate the counterfactual
outcome for the treated group in the hypothetical absence of treatment, by pairing each
treated household with a non-treated household that is similar in terms of its observed
characteristics. Matching relies on the conditional independence assumption (CIA) or
unconfoundedness assumption, which states that, conditional on a set of observable char-
acteristics X, the treatment status is independent of potential outcomes:
Ti ⊥ (Yi1, Yi0)|Xi (3)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that if assignment to treatment is strongly
ignorable given X, then assignment to treatment is also strongly ignorable given the
propensity score p(X), which means that we can reduce X to one dimension and match
on p(X) instead.
3.2 Implementation
In practice, we first need to construct a statistical comparison group based on a model
of the probability of participating in the treatment (i.e. receiving remittances), using a
set of observed characteristics. Then, households that receive remittances are matched
on the basis of this probability, or propensity score, to non-receiving households. The
average treatment effect of the program can finally be calculated as the mean difference
in outcomes across the two groups.
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Our main treatment is whether or not a household receives remittances in the year
2007. In this benchmark treatment, remittance-receiving households are matched to non-
receiving households, be they migrant-sending or non-migrant-sending households, and
the estimated impact is that of remittances (whether they come from a household member
or not). In order to refine the analysis, we also conduct separate analyses for the sub-
treatment of households who are both migrant-sending and remittance-receiving, and we
match them alternatively to migrant households who do not receive remittances and to
non-migrant households who do not receive remittances. The first match allows isolating
the impact of remittances among migrant-sending households; the second match captures
the joint effect of migration and remittances. As for the outcome variables, we consider
successively different definitions of expenditure: total expenditure or consumption per
capita; the expenditure shares of family business and of consumption; and the budget
shares of various consumption components.
The first step of PSM analysis consists in estimating the propensity score with selected
covariates. As recommended in the literature (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), only vari-
ables that influence simultaneously the treatment status (i.e. receiving remittances) and
the outcome variable (i.e. expenditure profile) should be included in this first step be-
cause unconfoundedness requires the outcome to be independent of treatment conditional
on the propensity score. Moreover, only covariates that are unaffected by the treatment
-hence, preferably observed prior to the treatment- should be included in the model so
as to avoid endogeneity due to exposure to the treatment. Yet, Lechner (2008) argues
that post-treatment variables may be included conditional on the fact that they are not
systematically affected by the treatment. As our database is cross-sectional and does not
contain any recall variables, we cannot select pre-treatment control variables to enter the
propensity score estimate and we must rely on post-treatment variables. However, since
we have information about each household member including migrants, incorporating
migrants’ information into our variables may reasonably help mitigate the potential en-
dogeneity issue. Moreover, since large-scale migration is a recent phenomenon in China,
it may limit the risk of a systematic influence of migration on household demographic
characteristics (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014).
Following papers that have recently applied the PSM approach to the analysis of mi-
gration and remittances on the left-behinds (Clément, 2011; Jimenez-Soto and Brown,
2012; Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014), we retain variables related to the household com-
position (including all members, either migrating or non-migrating), the education level
of household adult members, the size of the migration network at the village level and
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provincial dummies that account for unobservables that could influence migration and
consumption at the provincial level. We follow Bertoli and Marchetta (2014) and choose
not to introduce household head characteristics in the covariates, as it is usually done in
the literature, on the ground that household headship can be endogenous to migration.
Similarly, household land holdings are excluded because they may respond to migration
outcomes and therefore to remittance receipt5. Household composition variables include
the number of adult members in the household, the share of children below the age of
6, the share of children aged between 6 and 15, the share of elderly (over the age of
65), the share of female adults, all variables that are shown in the economic literature
to influence both the migration/remittances decision and household expenditure choice.
The education level of household adult members is measured by the average education
level of adult members and by a dummy indicating whether a member has ever completed
higher education. As argued by Bertoli and Marchetta (2014), focusing on adult mem-
bers should ensure that education decision has been taken independently of the receipt
of remittances. In order to limit potential endogeneity concerns, household composition
and educational attainment measures are computed on all household members, be they
migrant or not. Our measure of migration network is the village share of households
with migrants in 2005. As emphasized in the new economics of labour migration theory,
migration networks are important pulling out forces, partly because the formation of a
network reduces migration cost for new migrants (Massey et al., 1993). Table 5 displays
the logit estimation used to generate the propensity score for the full sample and for
the two sub-samples as described above. The overall goodness of fit measured by the
pseudo R squared ranges between a low 0.086 for the comparison of remittance-receiving
migrant households to non-remittance-receiving migrant households to a high 0.276 for
the comparison of remittance-receiving migrant households to non-remittance-receiving
non-migrant households.
The validity of PSM depends on several conditions. First, matching methods assume
conditional independence, which means that conditional on observable variables X, the
assignment to treatment is random, and the outcomes of non-treated units can be used
to approximate the counterfactual outcome of treated units in the absence of treatment.
Balancing tests allow checking whether observations with the same propensity score have
the same distribution of covariates, independent of the assignment. Table 6 displays
balancing tests for the main treatment (Column 1, Table 5), which check the equality of the
means of the covariates in the model before and after matching, as well as the standardized
5We thank one of the referees for drawing our attention to concerns about potential endogeneity of
land.
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bias before and after matching. It shows that after matching, the covariates are all well
balanced between the treatment and the control groups (with a percent bias after matching
less than 5%). Another balancing check, proposed by Sianesi (2004), consists in comparing
the pseudo R squared obtained from the logit model estimation on the matched and on
the unmatched samples. If the balancing is effective, then the observed characteristics
should explain very little of assignment to the treatment when estimated on the matched
sample only. The pseudo R squared is much lower after matching (equal to 0.002 against
0.162 for the unmatched sample) and the likelihood-ratio test of the joint significance of all
regressors is not rejected before matching (p-value of 0.000), but rejected after matching
(p-value of 0.447).
Second, a common support has to be imposed so as to reduce the bias in the estimate
(Smith and Todd, 2005) and this restriction requires that the overlap in propensity scores
across the participant and non-participant samples is sizeable. The comparison of the
distributions of estimated propensity scores among recipient and non-recipient households
(Figure 1, for the main treatment, as shown in Column 1, Table 5) shows large overlap,
which indicates that observables that predict the probability of receiving remittances are
distributed very similarly across the two groups.
The second step in PSM consists in using the estimated propensity scores to match
each remittance-receiving household with its “nearest” non-receiving household. Various
matching algorithms are available, and as discussed by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008)
each of them have their pros and cons. In this paper, we use a Kernel estimator that
matches the outcome of each treated household to a weighted average of the outcomes
of all the control households, assigning greatest weight to matched controls with the
closest propensity score. One major advantage of kernel matching is the lower variance
because more information is used. However, for the same reason, there could also be
“bad matches” (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) if outcomes with different propensity scores
are matched. In what follows, we use a Gaussian Kernel matching procedure with a
bandwidth parameter at 0.06, and we impose common support in all the estimations.
The average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) reported in Table 7 to Table 8 are
derived from this procedure.
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4 Results
4.1 Remittances and expenditure patterns
Table 7 presents ATT estimates of receiving remittances for the entire sample on a set of
various outcomes related to household expenditure and its composition. Concerning ag-
gregate expenditure, our estimates indicate that both total per capita expenditure and per
capita consumption significantly increase with receiving remittances. As far as the various
components of total expenditure are concerned, Table 7 shows that receiving remittances
is associated with a lower share of expenditure allocated to family business and in con-
trast, a higher share allocated to consumption. The negative gap between households
that receive remittances and their non-receiving counterparts amounts to 2.84 percent-
age points for the expenditure share on family business, and the positive gap amounts
to 3.72 percentage points for the expenditure share of consumption. These findings give
support to the view that remittances supplement income in rural China and that they
allow left behind families to increase consumption (de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008) when at
the same time migration entails lower need and/or lower opportunities to develop rural-
based family productive activities. The significantly lower share of expenditure allocated
to family business in remittance-receiving families may even suggest that the absence of
working-age adult(s) in the household, due to migration, has a strong detrimental impact
on the productive activities of the family, and that this detrimental impact more than
compensates any potentially positive effect of remittances on easing the budget constraint
of the left behinds and allowing them to invest in local family-run higher return activities.
Within consumption expenditures, two major components see their budget share in-
creasing when the household receives remittances: expenses for durable goods and ex-
penses for housing. By contrast, the budget share for education is significantly reduced
whereas that for food and medical care are left unchanged. These findings consistently
suggest that rural households in China favour investment in assets that immediately im-
prove their quality of life (consumptive investment as defined by de Brauw and Rozelle
(2008)) rather than in assets that increase their income-earning potential in the long run
(productive investment), including investment in human capital.
Why do remittance recipients allocate a smaller share of their budget to education
than non-recipients do whereas they have significantly more children aged 6 to 15? To
understand this education puzzle, a first issue to investigate is whether receiving house-
holds spend less on education per child and/or whether children in receiving households
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tend to drop out of school more systematically. The RUMiC survey contains a module on
the education of children that records useful information concerning the current education
status of children and the cost of education6. As reported in the last row of Table 4, the
amount of education spending per child strongly differs between remittance-receiving and
non-receiving households: whereas non-receiving households spend on average 496.7 yuan
per child for education purposes, receiving households spend only 325.5 yuan. A closer
look at the distribution of children across various education levels reveals an interesting
pattern: while there is no difference in educational attainment in primary and junior
secondary school between remittance-receiving and non-receiving households, for children
above the compulsory schooling (from senior high school), we observe a significant differ-
ence: 5.96 percent of non-receiving households have at least a child attending senior high
school (or above) against 3.84 percent for remittance-receiving households. These fig-
ures suggest a seemingly different behaviour towards post-compulsory education between
remittance-receiving families and non-receiving families, with migrant children dropping
out earlier while non-migrant children stay longer. Since post-compulsory education is
more expensive than compulsory education (mostly because most rural children have to
go to boarding schools in post-compulsory education), this may explain why the budget
share devoted to education is smaller for remittance-receiving households.
A second issue is why children in remittance-receiving households are more likely to
drop out. One explanation found in the economic literature on China is that the returns
to high school education acquired by rural residents in migrant labour markets in China
are very low. de Brauw and Giles (2008) even show that the opportunity cost to enrol
in high school in rural China is larger than the returns to education in migrant labour
markets in cities. Hence, migrant labour markets are likely to exert a powerful pull
on adolescents and signal low value of staying in school. In this context, the perceived
benefits of education received in rural China may be so low that remittance-receiving
households have no incentive to invest in human capital accumulation, and they rather
choose to allocate remittances to alternative use (perceived as having higher and/or more
immediate returns) and possibly send their children to join their migrant parent(s) and
work in cities. A complementary explanation could be that migrant adult members are
the more able in the family. The ones left behind are less likely to value education, and
therefore less likely to spend on this particular expenditure component. This could be the
case when migrants are parents who leave their children behind, under the care of (less
educated) grand-parents.
6Education costs are split in several items: school regular fees (including tuition fees, accommodation
and within school tutoring), extra-school tutoring fees, and other extra fees.
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4.2 Migration, remittances and expenditure
As discussed in Section 2, almost one-fifth of migrant households did not receive remit-
tances in 2007 whereas 24 percent of remittance-receiving households in 2007 are not
migrant-sending. In order to isolate the impact of remittances among migrant house-
holds, Specification (1) in Table 8 re-defines the treatment within the sub-sample of mi-
grant households as remittance-receiving versus non-remittance-receiving. The estimated
ATT are largely consistent with that of the full sample. Yet, three main findings are
worth discussing. First, compared to the full sample, the positive impact on per capita
expenditure and on per capita consumption is smaller in magnitude, but it is significant,
showing that in migrant households, remittances do significantly contribute to increasing
per capita expenditure and consumption. Second, the negative impact of remittances on
the expenditure share on family business seems stronger in migrant households compared
to the full sample. This finding corroborates the conjecture that migrant members may
be positively selected on their ability, and that the absence of the most able members
of the household further reduces investment in family business activities. Third, among
migrant households, those receiving remittances spend a significantly higher share of their
budget on housing, which adds evidence to the intuition that remittances are key inputs
in housing investment in rural China.
The combined effect of migration and remittances on expenditure patterns is illus-
trated in Specification (2), which compares remittance-receiving migrant-sending house-
holds with non-remittance-receiving non-migrant-sending households. Unsurprisingly, the
magnitude of the positive impact on per capita expenditure and per capita consumption is
much larger when migrant households are compared only to non-migrant (non-receiving)
households. Interestingly, the negative effect of migration and remittances on the educa-
tion budget share is also larger in this setting, which confirms the net detrimental effect
of migration on education.
4.3 The heterogeneous impact of remittances
In order to assess whether the impact of remittances is heterogeneous across different
contexts, we further split our sample along two additional dimensions: the position of the
household in the pre-transfer income distribution (by quartile), and whether the family left
behind lives in a coastal or an inland province. Within each of the 6 new sub-samples, the
treatment is whether or not a household receives remittances in the year 2007 (similar to
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the benchmark treatment for the full sample presented in Table 7). For each sub-sample,
we estimate propensity scores, match households within the sub-sample, and estimate
average treatment effects.
Table 9 displays the estimated ATT by pre-transfer income group and reveals note-
worthy heterogeneity in the impact of remittances on consumption patterns. As far as
aggregate expenditure is concerned, Table 9 first confirms the positive and significant
impact of receiving remittances on per capita expenditure and per capita consumption.
It also highlights that the increase is larger at the top of the pre-transfer income distri-
bution. Hence, although households in the poorest quartiles are the most likely to receive
remittances, in a larger amount (see Table 3), the per capita increase in consumption due
to remittances is 1.3 times larger for receiving households in the fourth quartile than for
receiving households in the first quartile.
In contrast with other income quartiles, the poorest households are clearly using mi-
gration as an additional source of income for the household. The substitution from ex-
penses on family business to expenses on consumption when remittances are received
is the highest for the first quartile, with a significant increase in the share of expendi-
ture on consumption associated with remittances as high as 4.68 percentage points and
a concomitant decrease in the share of expenditure on family business as high as 4.43
percentage points. The detrimental effect of migration on the productive activities of the
family highlighted for the full sample thus seems to come mostly from the poorest house-
holds and to hurt them the most. Moreover, the analysis of the budget shares indicates
that in the first quartile, remittance-receiving households do not use private transfers
from migrants differently from other sources of income, but instead take them as a com-
ponent in the pooled household income. Although remittances constitute an important
share of total income for the poorest group of households before transfer (Table 3), these
transfers do not seem to alter much the consumption behaviour in this group. Indeed,
the consumption pattern of the poorest quartile is not significantly different between
remittance-receiving and non-receiving households. The only, notable, exception is the
budget share for durable goods that appears significantly increased by 1.94 percentage
points when the household receives remittances. Receiving remittances allows households
in the first quartile to spend on these goods almost as much of their budget as average
households in the third quartile7.
Similar “moves” towards average households in above quartiles are also observed for
7The budget share for durable goods amounts to 14.9% on average for the third quartile, and to 12.2%
on average for the first quartile (see Table 3).
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remittance-receiving households in the second and the third quartiles. For instance,
remittance-receiving households in the second quartile exhibit a significantly lower budget
share for food and conversely a significantly higher budget share for durable goods. Both
changes make their budget shares for these items closer to the average budget share of
households in the third quartile (as displayed in Table 3). Similarly, remittance-receiving
households in the third quartile get closer to the average household in the fourth quartile
in terms of food, durable goods and housing budget shares.
Interestingly, the type of consumptive investment favoured by remittance-receiving
households also varies across quartiles: whereas the budget share for durable goods sig-
nificantly increases when households receive remittances in the first, second and third
quartiles, it is the budget share for housing that significantly increases when households
receive remittances at the top of the pre-transfer income distribution. As far as housing
consumption is concerned, receiving remittances results in a 1.75 percentage points in-
crease of the budget share allocated to housing in the top two quartiles. Since the average
budget share of housing for the third and fourth quartiles amounts respectively to 11.1%
and 12.8% (Table 3), these are sizeable effects. The positive impact of remittances on
housing budget shares for wealthier households may be interpreted in various ways. First,
housing investment may be used by wealthier remittance-receiving households as a signal
of migrants’ resources and support to their home family (Osili, 2004). In a similar vein,
it could be that remittance-senders impose conditions on the type of use of their transfers
by their family, and that they secure their position at home in the event of future return
precisely by investing in housing. In the case of China, both explanations may hold, es-
pecially because migrants maintain strong economic and social ties to their village, and
because a large share eventually returns. Under the standard investment explanation,
another interpretation as to why remittance-receiving households privilege investment in
housing could be that housing investment yields higher rates of return compared to alter-
native investment, including in human capital (Osili, 2004). Finally, the positive impact
of remittances on housing budget shares could also reveal persisting difficulties in various
markets in rural areas in China, despite the accelerating economic growth and reforms
during the 2000s. Referring to the end of the 1990s, de Brauw and Rozelle (2008) ar-
gued that housing investment was constrained in rural areas. The 2000s have witnessed a
strong development of the real estate sector in China, but our results suggest that housing
investment in rural China might still be largely constrained.
In the top quartiles, remittance-receiving households are not only characterized by a
different type of consumptive investment (towards housing rather than durable goods),
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they are also characterized by reduced productive investment, through a significant reduc-
tion in their budget share for education relative to other households. Hence, the overall
negative impact of remittances on the budget share allocated to education found in the
full sample (Table 7) seem to be mostly attributable to the top two quartiles. Receiving
remittances does not significantly affect the budget share allocated to education in the
first two quartiles, whereas it results in a 1.60 percentage points decrease in the third quar-
tile, and a 2.16 percentage points decrease in the fourth quartile. In these top quartiles,
remittance-receiving households spend on education as little of their budget as average
households in the lowest quartile (6.10%, see Table 3).
Table 10 provides additional insights into the heterogeneous effect of remittances by
location. Separate estimations for coastal and for inland provinces exhibit patterns that
are generally close to each other. Yet, they highlight an interesting feature regarding the
non-use of remittances for productive investment in rural China. One could reasonably
expect that coastal areas in China offer more opportunities for rural households to invest
in productive activities, and therefore they could use migration as a means to finance
such activities. The estimated ATT displayed in Table 10 suggest that migration does
not play such a role in rural coastal areas: the reduction in the share of expenditure on
family business (by 3.17 percentage points) and the increase in the share of expenditure
on consumption (by 4.86 percentage points) associated with remittances are even larger
in coastal provinces than in the aggregate estimates and than in inland provinces (respec-
tively 3.08 and 3.54 percentage points). Hence, it could be the case that even in coastal
provinces, migrant-sending households are not those most likely to start local business
activities or to invest much in agriculture. Such interpretation corroborates de Brauw
and Rozelle (2008)’s conclusions.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores how private transfers from internal migration in China affect the
expenditure behaviour of left behind families in rural areas using cross-sectional data on
rural households for the year 2007. Our main findings indicate that remittances from in-
ternal migration supplement income in rural China and increase per capita consumption.
As they represent a large share of income for the poorest households, remittances may
help mitigate the exposure to poverty for the most vulnerable. Regarding the budget allo-
cation pattern of rural households, the key results are twofold. First, remittance-recipient
households are found to spend more on consumption-type expenditures and less on pro-
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ductive investment. These findings from a large-scale recent dataset are consistent with
what has been observed on small-scale databases for the end of the 1990s and the early
2000s (de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Zhu et al., 2012, 2014). Yet, with the accelerating
economic growth and labour mobility in China during the 2000s, the persistence of a con-
sumption use of remittances may signal persisting difficulties in various markets in rural
areas. Second, within their budget for living expenses, remittance-receiving households
are found to favor investment in assets that immediately improve their quality of life,
such as housing or durable goods. By contrast, they reduce their budget share allocated
to education, and this effect holds in particular for the wealthiest groups of households.
These findings sharply contrast with the positive effect of remittances on investment of
families left behind found in other developing countries. This is the case for instance in
the Philippines where Yang (2008) shows that remittances are positively associated with
human capital investment and investment in more capital-intensive household enterprises.
The strong evidence of a negative impact of remittances on education budget share
found here points to the ambiguous perception of skill premium in China, notably in the
migrant labour market, and can be illustrative of the low perceived returns to education
in this particular labour market. It may also signal a lower value put on education by the
(less educated) rural left-behinds (e.g. grand-parents). Whatever the interpretation, this
finding points to the potentially strong detrimental impact of migration on rural areas
since education is a primary vehicle for poverty alleviation and also a vector for sustaining
economic growth through a middle income class. A straightforward implication is the need
for carefully designed education policies in rural areas, which would not only broaden the
access to non-compulsory education, but also ensure that the quality of both compulsory
and post-compulsory education meets the expected standard on the urban labour market.
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Table 1: Summary statistics by remittance status - Household characteristics, 2007
Non-receiving Remittance-receiving All Difference
households households households in means
Household size (excl. migrants) 3.411 3.103 3.262 ***
(1.279) (1.225) (1.262)
Household size (incl. migrants) 3.640 4.355 3.987 ***
(1.302) (1.343) (1.369)
# adult members 3.064 3.691 3.368 ***
(1.063) (1.150) (1.149)
Dependent over 65 in household 0.127 0.106 0.117 ***
(0.333) (0.307) (0.321)
Infants in household 0.117 0.195 0.155 ***
(0.321) (0.396) (0.362)
Children in household 0.462 0.545 0.502 ***
(0.499) (0.498) (0.500)
Average education of adult members 6.888 7.079 6.980 ***
(years) (2.414) (1.925) (2.193)
Coast 0.552 0.319 0.439 ***
(0.497) (0.466) (0.496)
Centre 0.307 0.416 0.360 ***
(0.461) (0.493) (0.480)
West 0.141 0.265 0.201 ***
(0.348) (0.441) (0.401)
Observations 3958 3724 7682
Notes: The last column displays the significance level of mean differences between remittance-receiving
and non-receiving households (NS: non-significant; *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***:
significant at 1%). The regional classification is the following: Coast includes Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
and Guangdong provinces; Centre includes Henan, Hubei and Anhui provinces, and West includes
Chongqing municipality and Sichuan province. Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 2: Summary statistics by remittance status - Income and expenditures, 2007
Unit: Yuan Non-receiving Remittance-receiving All Difference
households households households in means
Total net income 19661.4 19157.1 19416.9 NS
(19044.2) (11767.2) (15938.0)
Per capita net income (including migrants) 5739.5 4641.1 5207.0 ***
(5263.8) (2799.6) (4286.6)
Per capita net income (excluding migrants) 6185.9 7129.7 6643.4 ***
(5793.3) (5266.3) (5563.8)
Per capita expenditure 6965.0 7118.0 7039.2 NS
(8458.8) (5978.0) (7361.3)
Per capita consumption 4487.8 5100.0 4784.6 ***
(3853.2) (4691.7) (4290.9)
Household income composition
Net income from wages 7087.2 10719.2 8847.9 ***
(10373.8) (9563.3) (10152.1)
of which: Net wage income from local off-farm 5962.9 1775.0 3932.7 ***
(9434.6) (3461.5) (7486.3)
of which: Remittances 0 8458.7 4100.5 ***
(8362.3) (7194.9)
Net income from family farm operation 6773.6 6593.8 6686.5 NS
(10728.0) (5718.2) (8668.7)
Net income from family off-farm operation 3685.8 899.7 2335.2 ***
(11523.2) (3538.9) (8741.6)
Net property income 1033.0 275.0 665.6 ***
(8134.0) (1435.2) (5935.2)
Net transfer income 1081.8 669.2 881.8 ***
(3649.3) (2280.6) (3069.9)
Observations 3958 3724 7682
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The last column displays the significance level of mean
differences between remittance-receiving and non-receiving households (NS: non-significant; *: significant
at 10%; ***: significant at 1%). Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 3: Distribution of households and amount of remittances across pre-transfer income quar-
tiles, 2007
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile Total
% of households Obs.
Remittance-receiving 36.31 29.40 23.07 11.22 3724
Non remittance-receiving 14.58 21.00 26.91 37.52 3958
Average amount of remittances (yuan) 6296.7 4470.2 3581.7 2024.6 4100.5
(7428.3) (7107.8) (6779.4) (6775.5) (7194.9)
Total net income (yuan) 10576.4 13763.3 18493.9 35033.3 19416.9
(7760.1) (7186.0) (6937.6) (22524.8) (15938.0)
Per capita net income (yuan) 4459.5 5078.2 6268.3 10820.4 6643.4
(4208.6) (3575.1) (3573.2) (7502.9) (5563.8)
Total expenditure
Share of exp. on family business 0.242 0.237 0.214 0.185 0.219
(0.170) (0.161) (0.174) (0.196) (0.177)
Share of exp. on consumption 0.707 0.706 0.723 0.744 0.720
(0.175) (0.169) (0.185) (0.207) (0.185)
Budget shares for consumption expenses
Budget share for food 0.646 0.625 0.604 0.569 0.611
(0.153) (0.162) (0.161) (0.166) (0.163)
Budget share for durable goods 0.122 0.136 0.149 0.161 0.142
(0.0920) (0.0979) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0991)
Budget share for housing 0.103 0.112 0.111 0.128 0.114
(0.109) (0.127) (0.123) (0.146) (0.127)
Budget share for education 0.0610 0.0694 0.0786 0.0878 0.0742
(0.0910) (0.0984) (0.106) (0.121) (0.105)
Budget share for medical care 0.0676 0.0580 0.0575 0.0542 0.0593
(0.0919) (0.0830) (0.0856) (0.0870) (0.0870)
Notes: Expenditures on family business and on consumption do not sum up to 100% because “other expenditures”
(including taxes and fees, expenses on properties and on transfers) are not reported here. Standard deviations
in parentheses. Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 4: Budget shares by remittance-receiving status, 2007
Non-receiving Remittance-receiving All Difference
households households households in means
Total expenditure
Share of exp. on family business 0.214 0.224 0.219 ***
Share of exp. on consumption 0.716 0.724 0.720 **
Total consumption
Budget share for food 0.606 0.616 0.611 ***
Budget share for durable goods 0.141 0.144 0.142 *
Budget share for housing 0.112 0.115 0.114 NS
Budget share for education 0.0812 0.0668 0.0742 ***
Budget share for medical care 0.0602 0.0583 0.0593 NS
Per child education expenditure (yuan) 496.7 325.5 413.7 ***
Observations 3958 3724 7682
Notes: Expenditures on family business and on consumption do not sum up to 100% because “other
expenditures” (including taxes and fees, expenses on properties and on transfers) are not reported
here. The last column displays the significance level of mean differences between remittance-receiving
and non-receiving households (NS: non-significant; *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***:
significant at 1%). Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 5: Logit estimation for propensity score
Dependent variable: whether the household receives remittances
(1) (2) (3)
# adult members 0.602∗∗∗ (0.0275) 0.962∗∗∗ (0.0367) 0.150∗∗∗ (0.0517)
Share of children <6 1.574∗∗∗ (0.320) 1.272∗∗∗ (0.400) 2.148∗∗∗ (0.650)
Share of children 6-15 1.209∗∗∗ (0.185) 1.685∗∗∗ (0.231) 0.836∗∗ (0.378)
Share of elderly (>65) -1.847∗∗∗ (0.296) -3.135∗∗∗ (0.407) -1.136∗∗ (0.549)
Share of female adults -0.550∗∗∗ (0.189) -1.306∗∗∗ (0.236) 0.192 (0.324)
Average education 0.0484∗∗∗ (0.0131) 0.0863∗∗∗ (0.0165) 0.0107 (0.0271)
Tertiary education of adults -0.395∗∗∗ (0.0916) -0.288∗∗ (0.112) -0.536∗∗∗ (0.141)
Migration network 3.115∗∗∗ (0.244) 4.552∗∗∗ (0.312) 2.319∗∗∗ (0.445)
Hebei -0.0971 (0.126) -0.512∗∗∗ (0.165) -0.788∗∗∗ (0.255)
Jiangsu 0.179∗ (0.102) 0.300∗∗ (0.119) -0.334∗ (0.191)
Zhejiang -1.232∗∗∗ (0.124) -1.606∗∗∗ (0.169) -2.139∗∗∗ (0.221)
Anhui 0.503∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.734∗∗∗ (0.125) -0.451∗∗ (0.180)
Henan 0.380∗∗∗ (0.0991) 0.232∗ (0.122) -0.588∗∗∗ (0.184)
Hubei 0.866∗∗∗ (0.102) 1.023∗∗∗ (0.121) -0.0757 (0.180)
Chongqing 1.010∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.938∗∗∗ (0.159) -0.519∗∗ (0.218)
Sichuan 1.009∗∗∗ (0.102) 1.051∗∗∗ (0.120) 0.212 (0.194)
Constant -3.093∗∗∗ (0.185) -4.641∗∗∗ (0.237) 0.559 (0.367)
Observations 7682 6000 3346
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.276 0.0857
Notes: Specification (1) includes all households in the sample. Specification (2) is based on the sub-sample
of migrant-sending remittance-receiving households and non-migrant-sending non-remittance-receiving
households. Specification (3) is based on the sub-sample of migrant-sending households. Migration
network is measured by the village share of households with migrants in 2005. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 6: Balancing tests for propensity score matching
Variable Sample Mean % bias % reduction in bias
Treated Control
# adult members Unmatched 3.6907 3.0642 56.6
Matched 3.5961 3.5512 4.1 92.8
Share of children Unmatched .03969 .02622 16.9
Matched .03779 .03579 2.5 85.2
Share of children Unmatched .09944 .10702 -5.0
Matched .10153 .10595 -2.9 41.5
Share of elderly (>65) Unmatched .02577 .04248 -14.6
Matched .02632 .02824 -1.7 88.5
Share of female adults Unmatched .48416 .48827 -3.0
Matched .48402 .48347 0.4 86.5
Average education Unmatched 7.0788 6.8876 8.8
Matched 7.0621 7.0706 -0.4 95.6
Tertiary education of adults Unmatched .09291 .10687 -4.7
Matched .09412 .09868 -1.5 67.3
Migration network Unmatched .20775 .14182 41.5
Matched .1905 .18487 3.5 91.5
Hebei Unmatched .0427 .08186 -16.3
Matched .04494 .04887 -1.6 90.0
Jiangsu Unmatched .10929 .143 -10.2
Matched .10967 .1032 2.0 80.8
Zhejiang Unmatched .03249 .20465 -55.2
Matched .0342 .03877 -1.5 97.3
Anhui Unmatched .1297 .09247 11.9
Matched .1286 .12602 0.8 93.1
Henan Unmatched .12352 .12506 -0.5
Matched .12889 .13773 -2.7 -474.3
Hubei Unmatched .16273 .08969 22.1
Matched .15659 .15761 -0.3 98.6
Chongqing Unmatched .08324 .04497 15.7
Matched .08112 .08447 -1.4 91.2
Sichuan Unmatched .18179 .09626 24.9
Matched .1792 .1687 3.1 87.7
Notes: The balancing test refers to the benchmark specification of the propensity score with all
remittance-receiving households included in the treatment group no matter their migration status
(specification (1) in Table 5). Migration network is measured by the village share of households with
migrants in 2005. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 7: Average treatment effects - Full sample
Treated group Control group Difference Standard error Significance
Per capita expenditure 7165 6008 1157 208 ***
Per capita consumption 5142 3726 1416 115 ***
Total expenditure
Share of exp. on family business 0.2234 0.2518 -0.0284 0.0049 ***
Share of exp. on consumption 0.7243 0.6871 0.0372 0.0052 ***
Total consumption
Budget share for food 0.6155 0.6176 -0.0020 0.0044 NS
Budget share for durable goods 0.1438 0.1373 0.0065 0.0027 **
Budget share for housing 0.1155 0.1092 0.0063 0.0034 *
Budget share for education 0.0670 0.0806 -0.0136 0.0029 ***
Budget share for medical care 0.0581 0.0553 0.0029 0.0024 NS
Note: Gaussian Kernel matching estimator (bandwith: 0.06). A common support is imposed by dropping
5 percent of the treatment observations at which the score density of the control observations is the lowest.
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. Source: RUMiC Rural Household
Survey 2007.
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Table 8: Average treatment effects - Sub-samples
(1) Migrants sub-group (2) Migrants versus non-migrants
Difference Standard error Difference Standard error
Per capita expenditure 690 340 ** 2407 297 ***
Per capita consumption 985 233 *** 2286 152 ***
Total expenditure
Share of exp. on family business -0.0341 0.0090 *** -0.0226 0.0068 ***
Share of exp. on consumption 0.0371 0.0093 *** 0.0347 0.0071 ***
Total consumption
Budget share for food -0.0140 0.0080 * 0.0044 0.0060 NS
Budget share for durable goods 0.0030 0.0050 NS 0.0057 0.0036 NS
Budget share for housing 0.0169 0.0065 *** 0.0054 0.0045 NS
Budget share for education -0.0099 0.0054 * -0.0211 0.0039 ***
Budget share for medical care 0.0041 0.0045 NS 0.0056 0.0032 *
Note: See Table 7. Column (1) refers to the sub-sample of migrant-sending households, and compares
remittance-receiving with non-remittance-receiving households. Column (2) compares migrant-sending
remittance-receiving households with non-migrant-sending non-remittance-receiving households. Source:
RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 9: Average treatment effects - Testing for heterogeneous effects by income quartile of the left behinds
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Difference Std err Difference Std err Difference Std err Difference Std err
Per capita expenditure 1053 734 NS 1897 251 *** 2121 257 *** 2433 609 ***
Per capita consumption 1694 222 *** 1662 168 *** 1724 175 *** 2205 406 ***
Total expenditure
Share of exp. on family business -0.0443 0.0125 *** -0.0196 0.0090 * -0.0077 0.0092 NS 0.0196 0.0128 NS
Share of exp. on consumption 0.0468 0.0128 *** 0.0205 0.0093 ** 0.0115 0.0097 NS -0.0051 0.0132 NS
Total consumption
Budget share for food -0.0147 0.0111 NS -0.0205 0.0087 ** -0.0249 0.0085 *** -0.0028 0.0103 NS
Budget share for durable goods 0.0194 0.0064 *** 0.0173 0.0054 *** 0.0189 0.0053 *** -0.0020 0.0064 NS
Budget share for housing 0.0006 0.0081 NS 0.0051 0.0065 NS 0.0175 0.0068 ** 0.0175 0.0092 *
Budget share for education 0.0028 0.0064 NS -0.0042 0.0048 NS -0.0160 0.0055 *** -0.0216 0.0074 ***
Budget share for medical care -0.0081 0.0067 NS 0.0022 0.0050 NS 0.0045 0.0047 NS 0.0089 0.0050 NS
Note: See Table 7. Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 10: Average treatment effects - Testing for heterogeneous effects by location of the left
behinds
Coast Inland
Difference Std err Difference Std err
Per capita expenditure 1632 405 *** 897 172 ***
Per capita consumption 2312 235 *** 977 103 ***
Total expenditure
Share of exp. on family business -0.0317 0.0077 *** -0.0308 0.0058 ***
Share of exp. on consumption 0.0486 0.0084 *** 0.0354 0.0060 ***
Total consumption
Budget share for food -0.0057 0.0070 NS 0.0015 0.0056 NS
Budget share for durable goods 0.0103 0.0042 ** 0.0054 0.0035 NS
Budget share for housing 0.0053 0.0057 NS 0.0050 0.0043 NS
Budget share for education -0.0141 0.0049 *** -0.0142 0.0034 ***
Budget share for medical care 0.0043 0.0037 NS 0.0023 0.0031 NS
Note: See Table 7. The regional classification is the following: Coast includes Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
and Guangdong provinces; Inland includes Chongqing municipality and Sichuan, Henan, Hubei and
Anhui provinces. Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
33
Figure 1: Distribution of propensity scores of treatment and control groups, before and after
matching
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Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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